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Playing at the Circumference:
Towards a Theory of the Theatrical Symbolic
Lance Gharavi
. . . to tell a story you must ﬁrst of all construct a world . . . 
—Umberto Eco1
Nature is a temple where living pillars
At times allow confused words to come forth;
There man passes through forests of symbols
Which observe him with familiar eyes.
—Charles Baudelaire2
Historically, the concept of the symbol has played an important role in religious 
and mystic ritual, including those rituals from which, so it is supposed, theatre 
as we know it emerged. The dramatists and artists of the symbolist movement, 
inspired by their Romantic and mystic precursors, appropriated this concept 
and developed it into a style of literature and performance that was to give birth 
to the modernist avant-garde. For the symbolists, with their roots in religious 
mysticism and occultism, the symbol was the foundation of a cosmological—even 
cosmogonic—philosophy, and a means of accessing the life of the spirit. In the latter 
half of the twentieth century, however, the symbol as a function within literature 
and ritual came to be widely characterized not as a connection to the divine, but 
as mere allegory and signiﬁcation. Theatre, under the gaze of semiotic theory, has 
likewise been placed within this deracinated frame of signiﬁcation. Such placement 
removes the possibility for the theatrical symbolic and makes problematic if not 
impossible the notion of a sacred theatre sought by the symbolists and their avant-
garde progeny. 
In this paper, I examine a certain conceptualization of the symbolic, one that 
emerged into symbolism from currents within Western esotericism, and illustrate 
ways in which it is different from allegory and the structuralist sign. Relying 
signiﬁcantly on the literary theory of Hazard Adams, I will develop the idea of the 
symbol as a contrariety (in the Blakean sense) that will lead to a formulation of 
dramatic literature and theatrical performance as symbolic activity differentiated 
from signiﬁcatory activity. The aim of this investigation is to take an initial and 
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humble step towards a theory3 of theatre as symbolic activity that will suggest 
meaningful and non-alienating connections to the mystic aspects of ritual.
Most contemporary theory posits drama and theatre as signiﬁcation. The 
difﬁculty with this model, as useful as it is, is that it situates theatre, drama, and 
other forms of communication as radically cut off from meaning and the world by 
the unbridgeable gulf that divides reference from referent. The dilemma constructs 
a seemingly unassailable obstacle for the various forms of holy or sacred theatre 
attempted by numerous ﬁgures of the twentieth-century avant-garde. In these 
performances, under the model of signiﬁcation, every utterance, every gesture, 
even the performed actions themselves, serves only as indeterminate pointers to 
the spiritually transcendent. The Divine is banished from the stage, ﬂung down 
the inﬁnite staircase of the Saussurean signifying “chain.” Such pointing, such 
signiﬁcation, far from bringing the activity closer to the holiness it seeks, serves 
only to reify, indeed, to construct, the unbridgeable distance between humankind 
and the Divine. 
If, as I suggest below, the symbol is a function that operates quite differently 
from signiﬁcation or representation, then, for the symbol to exist as a function within 
theatre or drama at all, both must be conceived of as activities that are something 
other than “mere” signiﬁcation. I do not offer an argument against the model of 
signiﬁcation, much less a refutation. My goal here is to sketch the outlines of a 
different model, to make room for the possibility of the dramatic and theatrical 
symbolic. In doing so, I will transpose, into a theatrical context, Hazard Adams’s 
approach to the literary symbolic while incorporating certain concepts from the 
traditions of Western esotericism. The model of theatre and drama formulated in 
this examination will apply beyond the narrow and circumscribed boundaries of 
the historic symbolist movement to encompass a view of theatrical activity in a 
more general sense. Articulating this model will involve, in part, an initiation or 
renewal of a formulation of theatre that has become buried within the sepulcher of 
reprobate theory. Further, though I draw upon the concept of holy theatre as I trace 
the contours of this model, I consider the question of a holy theatre as separate from 
the concept of theatre as symbolic activity. My concern here is with the latter. The 
establishment of the latter will make possible the former. 
Among the foundational ideas of the mystic metaphysics that informed 
symbolist philosophy and practice, the concept of correspondence is perhaps the 
most vital. The symbolists drew this concept from a set of esoteric traditions that 
includes Kabbalah, Gnosticism, magic, alchemy, and Hermeticism. These traditions 
are not monolithic. They each constitute a diverse array of beliefs, practices, and 
philosophies. Further, though they are distinct from one another, each of these 
traditions is highly syncretic; the branches of their thought intertwine and connect 
like vines in an overgrown garden. While noting the differences within and among 
these traditions, Antoine Faivre, one of the founders of the modern study of Western 
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esotericism, cites several deﬁning characteristics shared by all; the ﬁrst of these is 
correspondence.4 The ancient notion of correspondence is based on the concepts 
of the macrocosm and microcosm that seem at once to reinforce and to deny a 
dualistic understanding of cosmology. According to this idea, human life and 
action (microcosm) are sensible manifestations of greater cosmic ﬁgures, forces, 
and movements (macrocosm). This concept is most succinctly summarized in 
the opening lines of The Emerald Tablet of Hermes Trismegistus, lines that are 
commonly further reduced to the familiar mystic saying, “As above, so below.” 
Hermes Trismegistus, or “Thrice-Greatest Hermes,” was the Greek incarnation of 
the Egyptian deity, Thoth, and the supposed author of those documents that form 
the foundation of the Hermetic tradition. In the Introduction to the anthology The 
Occult in Russian and Soviet Culture, Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal states that:
Symbolic and real correspondences are said to connect all parts 
of the visible and invisible world:  “That which is above is like 
that which is below, to perpetuate the mystery of the one thing” 
. . . according to the Emerald Tablet of Hermes Trismegistus. 
These correspondences are more or less veiled at ﬁrst glance; 
they have to be decoded. Everything in the universe is a symbol 
or sign. Everything harbors and manifests mystery.5
The panoply of Western religions, esoteric philosophies, and mystic and occult 
traditions, from Hermetism and the magic of the ancient Egyptians to the Kabbalah 
and contemporary Christianity, exhibits a broad and multi-colored diorama of 
metaphysical thought. All of these, however, are based upon a dualistic metaphysics 
that assumes a primordial Fall or at least a cosmogenetic bifurcation of reality 
into two constituent realms. The ﬁrst of these two realms is variously referred 
to as nature, matter, the temporal, the particular, or the phenomenal realm. The 
second realm is referred to alternatively as the Spirit, the immaterial, the eternal, 
the ideal, nothingness, silence, the universal, or the noumenal realm. The former 
realm, characterized by plurality, includes humankind and all that is perceivable 
to it. The latter is usually described as ineffable and unknowable; it is the realm 
of—variously, and among others—God, the Platonic forms, nous, or the collective 
unconscious and is characterized by unity. The relationship of these two realms is 
traditionally described, through spatial metaphor, as vertical. The realm of matter 
is “below” and the realm of Spirit is “above.” 
The term “correspondence” further describes this relationship in a manner 
that is apparently contradictory. According to the Emerald Tablet, the world of 
matter can be said to correspond to the world of Spirit because the two realms 
are not merely similar, that is, the world of matter and multiplicity is not merely a 
reﬂection of the Spirit, but rather, they are united in “the mystery of the one thing.” 
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This “one thing” contains and is contained by the multiplicity and particularity of 
the material realm. “In a word,” as Emanuel Swedenborg notes, “all things which 
exist in nature from the least to the greatest thereof, are correspondences.”6 So 
something strange happens when the theory of correspondence is applied to the 
Fall. Correspondence reveals the essential “one-ness” of the two worlds. The Fall 
is reversed, and duality is encompassed by unity. There is no bifurcation, for all 
oppositions are united in the “one thing.” The Kabbalists, for whom correspondence 
is a foundational concept, call this unity “God.” In Shi’ur Qomah, the sixteenth-
century Kabbalist Moses Cordovero states:
The Essence of divinity is found in every single thing—
nothing but it exists. Since it causes every thing to be, no thing 
can live by anything else. It enlivens them; its existence exists 
in each existent.
Do not attribute duality to God. . . . If you suppose that Ein 
Sof emanates until a certain point, and that from that point on 
is outside of it, you have dualized. God forbid! Realize, rather, 
that Ein Sof exists in each existent.7
The Kabbalists resolve the duality of the Fall and the ancient problem of “the one 
and the many” by claiming that the opposition of spirit and matter are uniﬁed in, 
and inseparable from, God. This action of uniﬁcation is the basis for correspondence 
theory.
The idea of God as a uniﬁcation of opposites, as a wholeness that encloses a 
coincidentia oppositorum, as an encompassing Spirit that uniﬁes, contains, and is 
All, is not limited to spiritually esoteric traditions. It is, for example, a foundational 
idea in Hegelian metaphysics. Hegel, even in his early writings, speaks out against 
the idea of the Divine as alien, remote, and purely transcendent. For Hegel, as he 
writes in his “Fragment of a System,” God is the uniﬁcation of the opposition of the 
one and the many—or, as he puts it, the inﬁnite and the ﬁnite. But not, he claims, 
simply as a dead relation among a universe of multiplicity, a unity as conceptual 
abstraction. Rather, God is a “living unity of the manifold.”8 
For the symbolists, who attempted to communicate a spiritual or universal 
experience in the language of the sensible and particular, symbols—those objects, 
images, words, or actions that correspond—are an ideal tool. For if the symbol is 
that which corresponds, then every word, every object in nature, every action, is 
a symbol that manifests the mystery of the Divine. Thus did Baudelaire pen the 
hypnotic suggestion that “man passes through a forest of symbols.”9
The mystery of the symbol lies in the inner contradiction implied by this 
theory, a contradiction between the necessary duality of two realms and a monistic 
“one thing.” Carlo Sini has suggested that the origins of the word “symbol” both 
imply and resolve such a contradiction. According to Sini, the term derives from 
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the original Greek verb sym-ballein, meaning “putting together.” The symbolon 
was the broken half of an object that could be united with its other half to serve as 
a means of recognition. Thus the symbol is a fragment of an original whole. Sini 
describes the symbol as a very special kind of sign. The symbol, like any sign, still 
refers or signiﬁes, yet the signiﬁer and signiﬁed are not “other.” “The symbol,” 
claims Sini, “does not refer to an ‘other,’ to a ‘different from itself’ but still to itself, 
to the ‘same’—the other to which the symbol refers is still to itself. . . . Each [part] 
is there to say that it is what it is because it derives its being from the unity that 
contained it, that kept it together.”10
Sini’s description of the self-identiﬁcation of the symbol, its “non-othered” 
relation to that to which it refers, is something very close to what we need for our 
theory. The difﬁculty with Sini’s claim is that he conceives of the relationship 
between the symbol and its “not-other” as one of signiﬁcation, as reference and 
referent, signiﬁer and signiﬁed. But this ﬂies in the face of Saussure and subsequent 
theorists who have shown that the signiﬁer and signiﬁed can never coincide. In 
order to resolve this difﬁculty, we need to conceive of the relationship between the 
symbol and its “not-other,” its “partner,” its “double,” if you will, as something 
other than signiﬁcation. We need to identify the nature of this relationship.
Sini’s identiﬁcation of the symbol as the coincidence of opposed or “othered” 
elements echoes the thinking of the symbolists and their antecedents, the Romantics, 
in both Europe and Russia. It is this characterization that differentiates symbol from 
allegory. In The Philosophy of Art, Friedrich Schelling draws the distinction:
That representation, however, in which the particular means the universal, 
or in which the universal is intuited through the particular is allegory.
The synthesis of these two, where neither the universal means the 
particular, nor the particular the universal, but rather where both are 
absolutely one, is the symbolic.11 
It is important to note that Schelling describes the allegoric relationship in terms of 
signiﬁcation. The allegory signiﬁes or represents, by means of ﬁgurality, that which 
it is not. Thus the lion is an allegory for courage in that, while the lion is entirely 
separate from courage, the former refers to or signiﬁes the latter. By contrast, the 
symbolic relationship is one of coincidence and tautology; both are “absolutely one.” 
Schelling’s “universal” and “particular” are part of a set of associated oppositions 
like “one and many,” and “above and below” that are uniﬁed in the correspondence 
theory of the symbolic.
Mircea Eliade describes the relationship between the symbolic “partners” by 
invoking the concepts of immanence and archetype. He conceives of the world 
as a non-linguistic language composed of objects that enclose archetypes that are 
immanent within them.12 Here, the “above” is identiﬁed with archetypes that are 
in a relationship of immanence with the “below.” Symbols, for Eliade, are these 
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non-linguistic objects—part of the world—that are signiﬁed by words. In this case, 
the world is a non-linguistic language of correspondences and our own linguistic 
language is “signiﬁcation and an imitation of the true language which is the 
world itself.”13 This conception leaves room for a theatrical symbolic if theatre is 
conceived of as in and of the world, as opposed to something that is somehow set 
apart from the world and merely signiﬁes objects and events therein. Theatre, in the 
former case, would be part of the non-linguistic world of symbols that correspond to 
the archetypes that are immanent within it. Yet for Eliade, there can be no literary or 
verbal symbolic based on correspondence. In his conception, our language merely 
refers to the world of symbols through signiﬁcation. Language and the world are 
thus, in Eliade, irredeemably separated. We must turn to Hazard Adams and his 
theory of the literary symbolic if our theatrical symbolic is to include language. 
To describe the correspondence conception of the symbol, Hazard Adams uses 
the example of the Eucharist in which the bread and wine do not merely represent 
the body and blood of Christ, but rather that the bread and wine are coincident 
with and contain the body and blood of Christ.14 Adams refers to this relationship 
of correspondence between two separate realities—one of which is “fallen”—as 
the “miraculous symbolic,” and contrasts it to his own conception of the “secular 
symbolic.” This “secular” concept of the symbol is similar to the “miraculous” 
type in that both involve the coincidence of signiﬁer and referent, yet the former 
operates without the mystical baggage or the Fall implied by the latter. Adams’s 
conception of the secular symbolic is based on a theory of language as “proliﬁc” 
or creative rather than as signiﬁcatory. I shall return to this notion, a crucial one 
for Adams, later in this essay. 
There are three sets of terms that Adams, borrowing from William Blake, 
introduces to construct his notion of the secular symbolic:  circumference and 
center; myth and antimyth; and contraries and negations. Center and circumference 
describe different and opposing metaphysical perspectives. When standing at the 
center, all that is—experience, nature, or any referent—is without or outside of 
the self. Even in a mode of reﬂexive self-analysis, the self is projected outside of 
the self as other. The entire world is alien and the self is a member of what Blake 
calls the “priesthood” that interprets this other. At the circumference, all that is is 
inside and part of the self. “You contain the world in the form your imagination, 
including your power of language, gives it.”15 The circumference contains and is 
all, while the center excludes all as other. 
Blake’s concepts of myth and antimyth are closely related to circumference 
and center. The condition of myth, according to Adams, involves the placement 
of all that is, again, including the power of language, inside the imagination and 
the identiﬁcation of each individual element with the whole while maintaining 
the individuality of each element. Thus in myth, there is a paradox:  the particular 
encompasses the whole and the whole, every particular. Antimyth is the reverse of 
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this state. It is the externalization and objectiﬁcation of all that is. It involves, “an 
isolated, purely subjective and totally passive consciousness, alien to everything 
else.”16 At the antimythic pole, one points outward to everything as other, as allegory 
signiﬁes or points towards that which is not itself. Myth is thus circumferential 
while antimyth is a center. Adams constructs a continuum, or rather, a cycle, on 
which he places various humanistic activities including language and myth, art, 
criticism, history, religion, and mathematics (in that order) in a range between 
myth and antimyth.17 
The Blakean concept of negation involves a binary opposition—like subject/
object—wherein one side is central and privileged and the other side is repressed 
and marginalized. Furthermore, each constituent in the opposition is identiﬁed as 
what it is by virtue of the fact that it is not the opposing constituent. Contrariety is 
a circumferential form that encloses a duality wherein one side is the distinction 
between the two elements while the other side is the denial of such a distinction 
in favor of the identity of the two. “Identity,” for Adams, is precisely the contrary 
to the distinction difference/non-difference. Thus, rather than deconstructing 
hierarchical dualities as Jacques Derrida deconstructed speech/writing, the contrary 
encloses duality in a unity. The terms of the opposition are both different and the 
same and neither merely the same nor merely different. Contrariety operates as a 
syzygy in the Jungian sense, the conjunction of a pair of opposites results in the 
two becoming one. 
It is important to point out that the contrariety, as an enclosing union of 
oppositions, does not affect the complete erasure of all distinction between the 
constituents. As in Hegel’s “Fragment of a System,” opposites are both posited and 
united; that is, neither term is dissolved while both are one. This idea is succinctly 
manifest in the Chinese symbol of the yin-yang. The yin-yang is composed of a 
circle divided in half by a backwards S-curve. The black half (yin) and the white 
half (yang) each contain a small circle of their opposite color. That the two apparent 
opposites are enclosed within the circumference of a circle, the symbol of cosmic 
unity, reveals that the polar duality of the yin and yang are one. The presence of 
the small circle of black in yang and the small circle of white in yin reveals that 
each half contains the seed of the other. As the seed grows, the yin becomes yang 
and the yang, yin. The two forces are not in conﬂict, the one negating the other. 
They are dynamically interdependent, constantly striving to complete one another. 
They are a duality in unity and a unity in duality. 
We see another example of this in Viachelav Ivanov’s essay, “The Essence of 
Tragedy.” For Ivanov, Apollo signiﬁes the principle of unity, or the monad, while 
Dionysus signiﬁes the principle of duality, or the dyad. This monad/dyad is an 
opposition. Unlike Nietzsche, Ivanov sees tragedy as essentially Dionysian. Yet he 
swerves back somewhat towards a Nietzschean position with regard to tragedy when 
he brieﬂy uses the term dyad in a different sense. The dyad, in Ivanov’s thought, is 
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the contrary to the monad/dyad opposition. “The concept of the dyad presupposes 
an initial, intrinsic unity, in which internal opposition is revealed. From the very 
start, this existence must harbor a certain duplicity within itself—not as an inner 
contradiction, but as an inner wholeness.”18 Yet this concept of the dyad harbors 
the necessity of the temporal. For Ivanov, this contrariety is a uniﬁed primordial 
state that does not endure, for “as the energy concealed in it grows,” the unity is 
torn apart into opposition, into “masks of division and discord.”19 This action is 
depicted in the Dionysian myth through the suffering of the dismembered god.
The concept of contrariety is a paradox involving a coincidentia oppositorum—
a union of opposites or otherwise “othered” elements. This is a paradox that 
reoccurs throughout the history of mystic and esoteric thought. It may be seen in 
the writings of Vladimir Solov’ev in the form of the chemical marriage and the 
concept of sobornost (a social and religious term that encompasses the concept of 
unity in multiplicity and multiplicity in unity). It appears throughout alchemy in 
the form of iconography and concepts like the androgyne and the wedding of the 
King and Queen. In Christianity, it is present in what Kierkegaard referred to as the 
Absolute Paradox—the simultaneous divinity and humanity of Christ. This paradox, 
according to Søren Kierkegaard, is that beyond which thought cannot go. It is the 
“undoing” of thought, the collision of thought with that “which thought cannot 
think.”20 Hegel comes to much the same conclusion when he states that the union 
of oppositions “is not something propounded by the understanding or by reﬂection 
but has a character of its own, namely, that of being a reality beyond all reﬂection.” 
He thus reaches the conclusion that philosophy “has to stop short of religion. . . .”21 
In this paradox of contrariety, a in a/b is both b and not b. It is a circumferential 
form. It must therefore be placed at the mythical pole. Antimyth cannot accept such 
paradox—or any paradox, for that matter—for logic stands at the antimythical pole 
and the paradox of identity violates both the law of non-contradiction and the law 
of the excluded middle. Since it transgresses the fundamental laws of thought, such 
a paradox, as both Kierkegaard and Hegel suggest, is not accessible by means of 
rational thought, much less any discursive explanation. In his Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, Wittgenstein states, “We cannot think what we cannot think; so what 
we cannot think we cannot say either.”22 Later in this same work, he continues this 
thought:  “There are, indeed, things which cannot be put into words. They make 
themselves manifest. They are what is mystical.”23 Wittgenstein is articulating 
here that there are some things that cannot be said. They must be shown. Hence 
the iconography of the symbol in mystic traditions. Hence the non-discursivity of 
poetry. Hence the theatre.
Adams identiﬁes the symbolic with the terms myth, circumference, and 
contrariety. As it involves the paradox of the union of oppositions, the symbolic 
is a contrariety. Since myth is the condition in which the particular encompasses 
the whole and the whole every particular, the symbol as correspondence—the 
Fall 2006                                                                                                             13
miraculous symbol—is within the circumferential form of myth. It harbors within 
its circumference both the “above” and “below,” placing these in a condition of 
identity without effecting the erasure of either. Adams’s secular symbolic is likewise 
mythic and likewise a contrariety. Both of these conceptions of the symbolic 
involve the coincidence of “partners,” the symbol and its “double” described by 
Sini. The symbol is the contrary to the negation subject/object or signiﬁer/signiﬁed. 
It is, as Kierkegaard describes the Absolute Paradox, the condition of “absolute 
unlikeness in absolute likeness.”24 Allegory and signiﬁcation, on the other hand, 
are antimythic, upholding the logical oppositions and negations of sign/referent 
and subject/object.
At this point, I think it worthwhile to state, parenthetically, two things. First, 
though the concept of the symbol as contrariety, as a paradox, and therefore as “that 
which we cannot think,” may seem to be a philosophical giving up, a “game called 
on account of mystery,” it is no more so than the retreat into mystery that constitutes 
the arrival at the “play of differences”—a concept initiated by Saussure and one 
that Derrida, as he takes pains to point out, wrestled away from intelligibility into 
a realm of utter darkness. 
Secondly, this conceptualization of the symbol—the mythic, circumferential 
contrariety of Adams, the joining of the broken halves described by Sini—suggests 
a kind of wholeness that stands in marked contrast to the “ﬁssure” or the “gap” 
that fractures the Saussurean sign, that makes its meaning unknowable and 
inﬁnitely deferred, that banishes presence. But the “wholeness” of the symbolic 
as correspondence—insofar as the correspondence symbolic participates in, or is 
in fact, wholly Divine—is also a kind of “holeness,” a “nothingness.” By this, I 
mean something more than that the symbol, in this conception, acquires something 
of the idiot stare of paradox. In the correspondence model, the “above” realm is, 
as I have noted, often described as Nothing, Silence, ineffable and unknowable. 
The Kabbalists speciﬁcally refer to the Divine, Ein-Sof, as Ayin, or “Nothing.” 
The contrariety of the correspondence symbol, the joining of the halves broken by 
the Fall, may thus be understood as completing not a whole, but a hole; opposites 
come together to form a nothing, or, rather, Nothing. In this sense, the symbol 
is a circumference that encloses an “all” and excludes or externalizes nothing 
while simultaneously enclosing only “nothing.” The circumference is both a 
whole and a hole, a fullness and an absence. All symbols, in the sense that they 
are correspondences, participate simultaneously in All and in Nothing which, in 
the circumference that is the mystic’s Divine, are one. Insofar as it participates in 
Ayin, the fertility of the symbol as the object of a robust hermeneutic activity is 
understandable. Nature, and our nature, abhors a vacuum; hence the fecundity of 
the symbol, its indeterminacy, dynamism, and generative capacity. 
The structuralist’s “play of differences” offers a similar mystery. Difference—
the system that structures, among other things, language—in the hands of Derrida 
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becomes “différance,” a term he struggles to identify (or not identify) by resorting 
to a kind of negative theology. He describes what différance is not. The difference, 
he points out, that lets phonemes be heard, that allows words to be understood, is 
itself inaudible. This difference, even in graphic rather than aural contexts, escapes 
into darkness and away from intelligibility. Différance is not a thing; it is not a 
word or a concept; it cannot be exposed, cannot be present. Rather, it is that which 
makes the presentation of presence possible. Derrida, in describing what différance 
is, crosses out the word “is”25 to show, not just what différance is not, but that 
différance is not, that it does not exist. Différance cannot be described, exposed, or 
said to exist or to be anything, for, if this were so, it would be participating in the 
system of differences that it, itself, makes possible. Thus exposing, even naming, 
différance causes it to vanish.
The status of Derrida’s différance is thus very much like the status of the 
Absolute, the “above,” the Kabbalist’s Ein-Sof   26—which is to say, no status 
whatsoever. In describing it in words or images, in giving it a name, one makes it 
a thing or a concept like everything else. It becomes, in the antimythic model of 
language, identiﬁed by and through difference. It becomes ﬁnite, a being rather than 
the pre-condition of being. Thus Ein-Sof named or described becomes not-Ein-Sof. 
The same holds for Ayin. Ayin is a nothing beyond nothing, beyond the concept or 
word, “nothing,” beyond even “beyond nothing,” and so on in an inﬁnite series. 
Any attempt to expose it, to make it intelligible, diminishes and erases it. But this 
is the ﬁction of antimyth. 
Derrida rejected all charges of mysticism in his philosophy. Différance, he 
claimed, encloses and is beyond all onto-theology. Nevertheless, his [non-]concept 
of différance is something very close to the [w]hole-ness of the mystic’s Absolute 
as All and as Nothing, as the gaping, vacant precondition of multiplicity. 
To return to our discussion:  the conception of the symbol as contrariety 
allows—setting aside, for the moment, the problem of language—for the theatrical 
symbolic. If everything in the world is a correspondence, that is, a miraculous 
symbol, then theatre is symbolic activity. Yet this is true only if theatre is conceived 
of as in and of the world as opposed to something apart that signiﬁes or points 
to the world and experience. We need not even stake such a claim to a belief in 
mystic correspondence in order to recognize the theatre as symbolic activity. If 
theatre radically creates rather than signiﬁes or represents that which is prior and 
external to it, it is mythic—for myth is the very condition of what Adams calls 
the “proliﬁc,” or creative—and coincident with the world it creates. That is, if we 
conceive of theatrical activity not as a copying or re-presentation of a reality that 
is cast outside and before the activity as an object, but rather as creative, then the 
objects, images, and actions of the theatre event are coincident with their referent. 
Indeed, the use of the term referent may not even be appropriate here since, in this 
mythic conception, the world that theatre creates refers only to itself. But even 
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this is misleading, for there is no referentiality, self- or otherwise, involved. The 
theatrical event contains all that it creates. There is no duality of signiﬁer/signiﬁed. 
Those oppositions are united in the contrariety of the theatre. It is only from the 
antimythical stance of the critic, acting as a member of the Blakean “priesthood,” 
that theatre is pulled away from myth into antimyth and representation. It thus 
becomes the “prisonhouse of theatre” that can only signify a world that it projects 
as forever separate and unattainable. Such a world is a ﬁction created by antimyth, 
albeit not in the same fashion in which the world created by theatre is also a ﬁction. 
For the “world” of antimyth is equally unattainable from within the empiricist 
“prisonhouse of perception” à la David  Hume and the “prisonhouse of language” 
à la Fredric Jameson. The difference, from a mythical standpoint, is that the world 
created by the theatrical event is coincident with that event as a circumferential 
form of myth.  
The late nineteenth-century realist/naturalist movement conceived of theatre 
from an antimythic standpoint based largely on empirical and scientiﬁc models. 
The symbolists’ theatre, developing almost simultaneously, reacted against 
the naturalists, conceiving of theatre as mythic and creative and utilizing the 
circumferential forms of symbol and correspondence. Andrei Bely, in his essay 
“Theater and Modern Drama,” argues for theatre as creative in this radical sense:
[T]he revolutionary force of symbolism lies in its declaration 
that artistic creativity is the unique principle capable of creating 
life. The meaning of life is in the creation of it and not in the 
cognition of it. Life is a form of artistic creativity. The mission 
of art is to stimulate creative activity. . . . symbolism emphasizes 
the dynamics of creativity. That is why it opposes academic 
pedantry as a principle of stasis in art.27 
If theatre is creative and symbolic, rather than signiﬁcatory, then all theatre, 
including realist theatre, must be mythic. There must be a cycling back into myth 
of realism’s antimythic pretense. Adams notes such a cycling back in the humanistic 
activity of mathematics, which stands at the antimythic pole. He associates myth 
with the creative or Blakean “proliﬁc.” He further claims that antimyth is always 
emerging from myth and that the whole continuum, from the mythic to antimythic 
pole, from circumference to center, is creative. As he notes:
As we pass further and further outward (really, of course, 
inward, creating more and more externality as we go), what we 
create is the ﬁction or antimyth of externality—until we reach 
mathematics, where something very strange happens—for 
mathematics proceeds to assert its power to contain claims that 
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the world is mathematical rather than that mathematics represents 
the world.28
When antimyth has exhausted itself at the mathematical pole, it ﬁnds that it contains 
and creates that which it describes as external to itself and thus cycles back to the 
condition of myth. It is precisely this cycling back to the proliﬁc activity of myth 
that Bely refers to when he writes on realism in his essay “The Cherry Orchard.” 
In realism, claims Bely, we have the creation of minutiae in constant repetition. 
As these minutiae are repeated, we delve deeper and deeper into them, eventually 
“seeing through” them as through an aperture to Eternity. This “Eternity” is a 
condition of myth, a circumferential form, a whole that encompasses, and is 
encompassed by, every minutia. The minutiae are thus coincident with that which 
we see when we look through them. They are, in fact, symbols. “Thus,” claims 
Bely, “realism imperceptibly crosses over into symbolism.”29 
Bely’s suggestion, made in the context of correspondence theory and the idea of 
art as radically creative, is relevant beyond his immediate concern with Chekhov’s 
drama. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, in correspondence, everything that is 
“below” is in a condition of contrariety with the “above;” everything is a symbol. 
This includes not only the Blakean wildﬂowers and grains of sand, but also theatrical 
performances, including the works of Chekhov and other realists. All theatre is 
holy. All performance manifests mystery. Secondly, since art, including theatre, 
is, in Bely’s conception, radically creative, since it does not stand apart from the 
“forest of symbols,” gesturing to it through signiﬁcation, it is therefore part of 
the “below”—indeed, generative of the “below”—and thus, like everything else, 
a window to the Divine. For Bely, the capacity for revelation, the ability to peer 
through this window, resides in the viewer or reader—one who is ready, as Blake 
suggests, “to see a world in a grain of sand.” 
It is not the case that, simply, symbolism is mythic while realism is antimythic. 
Rather, the theories that informed the worldviews of symbolism and realism are, 
respectively, mythic and antimythic. For Adams, as for Bely, realist drama—like 
symbolist and all other drama—is mythic because it is literature, because it is art, 
an activity that Adams locates near the mythic pole.30 But the extreme empiricism, 
upon which realism relies for its worldview, ultimately, for Adams, cycles back, 
like the mathematics described above, from the antimythic pole to the condition 
of myth. 
There is a danger to which some among both the symbolists and those in 
the mystic and occult traditions fall victim. This is the danger of conceiving of 
symbols in terms of allegory. Yeats, who remains an important ﬁgure in the history 
of the occult as well as of poetry and drama, in his essay “Symbolism in Painting” 
agrees with the deﬁnition of the symbol given by a modern dictionary “that calls a 
symbol ‘the sign or representation of any moral thing by the images and properties 
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of natural things,’ which, though an imperfect deﬁnition, is not unlike ‘The things 
below are as the things above’ of the Emerald Tablet of Hermes!”31 Here, Yeats 
accepts a deﬁnition of both the symbol and correspondence indicated in the Emerald 
Tablet as allegoric and therefore antimythical. This symbol is an allegory in that it 
“represents” or signiﬁes. The occultists were often guilty of sliding into antimyth 
through their bureaucratization of the symbol as allegory. These occultists and the 
symbolists claimed power, not, as Bely believed the artist had, through the creative 
capacity of the symbol as mythic form, but by declaring themselves to be holders 
of the secret knowledge of the allegoric symbol’s hidden referent. Thus, in this 
conception, both the occultist and the symbolist artist are privileged. Yet such an 
assertion is self-defeating, for it is based on the same antimythical negation of 
subject/object that is the foundation of the empiricism and science against which the 
symbolists rebelled. As Audre Lorde wrote, “The Master’s tools will never dismantle 
the Master’s house.”32 The symbolists’ and occultists’ tendency to conceive of the 
symbolic as a secret code does violence to the symbol through allegorization, thus 
opening up the above/below divide they sought to overcome. The problem with 
the code is not that it privileges the symbolist or that it is exclusionary—this is 
“only” a political issue. The problem with the code is that it is a code. It operates 
allegorically. The challenge for the occultist, for the symbolist, the challenge facing 
any theory of the symbolic—theatrical, literary, or otherwise—is to circumvent 
conceptions of the symbolic as a hermetic and codiﬁed system. The challenge is 
to ﬁnd a cure for the common code.
Thus far, I have discussed the possibility of the theatrical symbolic aside from 
the issue of language. Yet if there is to be a true theatrical symbolic that does not 
limit theatre to mime, or further, a dramatic symbolic, the case must be made for the 
symbolic in language and literature. For this, we must posit a language of myth. 
In the signiﬁcatory model of language, any particular word or signiﬁer is 
identiﬁed by the way in which it is different from other signiﬁers in the system. 
Furthermore, since neither the signiﬁed nor certainly the referent is ever present 
in the signiﬁer, the signiﬁed is always already deferred in favor of a “play of 
differences.” There is no presence that stands behind and is pointed to by the 
signiﬁer. Not only do the two not coincide, the latter cannot really be said to signify 
the former. Only by embracing and taking part in the play of differences can we 
escape our longing for a presence, a center (not in the Blakean sense), a world, a 
logos, or an origin of meaning. For Derrida, this presence is a myth (again, not in the 
Blakean sense), while for Paul de Man, it is “hidden” behind and by the signiﬁer. 
This conception of language is fundamentally antimythical, upholding the 
difference/indifference negation as well as that of subject/object. It relies on logical 
oppositions even while it deconstructs them through acts of Derridian “decentering.” 
It hypostatizes an origin of meaning, which it then either dismisses or mourns as 
unknowably hidden and separate. This situation inevitably leads to a pathology 
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of imprisonment wherein we become trapped within language as Hume trapped 
us within perception. There is no room here for a symbol that would provide a 
contrary to logical opposition that could, as in Sini, create a harbor for the coming 
together of signiﬁer and signiﬁed. There is certainly no room for a theatre that is 
holy, for in the signiﬁcatory model of language the Divine becomes a signiﬁed, the 
presence of which is banished irremediably from all utterance. To speak of God is 
to make God absent. Here, there is only the difference of allegory.
A language of myth would have to avoid a conception of language wherein 
every utterance (whether onstage or off) or instance of writing (dramatic, literary, 
or otherwise) is a “copying” or a signiﬁer of a previous origin or world, whether 
or not that world is to be dismissed or proclaimed unattainable and our copying 
only play. Adams’s notion of the “secular” symbolic is based on such a language 
of myth. Though he focuses primarily on poetry, he is unwilling to privilege poetry 
and extrapolates the functioning of poetic language, as he describes it, out into 
language in general. 
The language of myth is a creative language in a radical sense. It is the 
language of those whom Blake describes in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell as 
the “ancient Poets.” These poets named objects through the constitutive power of 
language and thus created them. Adams, in describing this action, points out that 
these poets did not set about naming “real,” preexisting objects, that is, objects that 
had an existence other than as potential inside the mytho-poetic imagination, but 
rather that the action of naming radically created the objects. The radically creative 
power—which is what Adams means by “myth”—is opposed to the “passive 
reception of subsequently named sense data” 33—or, in Adams’s term, antimyth. 
This “proliﬁc” power of language held by Blake’s ancient poets is similar to the 
fabled Edenic tongue, the language of Adam, spoken of in Kabbalah. In the Edenic 
tongue, to name a thing was to create it. It was a perfectly transparent language 
in that there was nothing “hidden” behind, or referred to, by the word. The word 
and the referent were coincident. Kurt Seligmann, in The History of Magic and 
the Occult, speaks similarly of ancient Egyptian incantations that had a radically 
creative power identical to the Edenic tongue. “Nothing,” claims Seligmann, “could 
come into being before its name had been uttered. . . . ‘The word,’ the hieroglyphics 
tell us, ‘creates all things:  everything that we love and hate, the totality of being. 
Nothing is before it has been uttered in a clear voice.”34 In the Gospel of John, the 
Word has a similar cosmogenetic power. It is responsible for the creation of the 
cosmos and is furthermore identiﬁed as God. “In the beginning was the Word, and 
the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning 
with God. All things were made by him; and without him was not anything made 
that was made.”35 Later, the Word becomes present in the world and thus God 
coincides with his creation in the person of Christ. “And the Word was made ﬂesh, 
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and dwelt among us . . . full of grace and truth.”36 Here, the Word not only holds a 
creative power, but becomes indistinguishable from that which it creates. 
This concept also appears in the writings of Bely who posits not only the 
radically creative power of art—as cited above—but also, and most importantly, 
of language. Borrowing a term deployed by Solov’ev, Bely describes the work of 
the poet as a kind of theurgy—the act of invoking the gods, of making them present 
through magical ritual. Poetic language, for Bely, was magical in a quite serious 
and literal sense. It produced an effect on the world. Speciﬁcally, the activity of 
poetic language was one of radical creation, of calling-into-being. Bely and other 
symbolists were reluctant to claim that this theurgic, generative power was an 
exclusive property of poetry or art.37 They extended this power to language in 
general. “Language,” claims Bely, “is the most powerful instrument of creation. 
When I name an object with a word I thereby assert its existence.”38 But, like 
the activity of Blake’s ancient poets, this naming is not to be conceived as the 
designating of an already existing thing in a world that lies outside of language. 
The thing, the world, and even the naming subject him- or herself are all generated 
through the theurgic activity of language. As Bely states, “consciousness, nature, 
and the world emerge for the cognizing subject only when he is able to create 
a designation. Outside of speech there is neither nature, world, nor cognizing 
subject. In the word is given the original act of creation.”39 Steven Cassedy, in his 
commentary on Bely’s theories of the theurgic power of language, notes that
Bely’s ideal poetic language is thus a kind of Edenic discourse 
where words are endowed with the same degree of ontic reality 
as their referents and are consequently virtually conterminous 
with them. . . . By implication, then, either the literary aesthetic 
object or the world created by it (and there is a strong suggestion 
that they are the same thing) enjoys an ontic status of phenomenal 
reality analogous to that of real objects in the natural world.40 
Bely is describing a mythic language that creates and contains a world that is, 
from an antimythic viewpoint, (mis)understood as its referent. Cassedy’s hedging 
with the term “virtually conterminous” is the contrariety proposed by Adams. 
The distinction that Cassedy cites between phenomenal reality and the “real” or 
“natural” world is one that troubles Bely’s thought as he struggles to identify the 
theurgic properties of language. With regard to these two worlds, the phenomenal 
and the “real,” there is the strong suggestion that the latter—a world conceived of 
as external to and independent of language—is produced as an effect by and of the 
former rather than the other way around. Furthermore, since phenomenal reality is 
itself produced by the theurgic power of language, the latter likewise produces the 
“ﬁction” of an extra-lingual, or “real” reality. Bely’s argument is often confused 
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and sometimes contradictory in this regard and in others. At times he seems to treat 
theurgic language as disclosure rather than creation. At these points he slips into 
an antimythical conception of language by positing language as a revealing, an 
unveiling of that which does not owe its existence to the making power of language. 
Elsewhere, however, he states that the creative act of poetic production endows 
the poetic image with an ontological being that is independent of consciousness. 
It becomes an incarnation. “It comes to life and acts autonomously.”41 
The language of Blake’s ancient poets, the Edenic tongue, the incantations 
of the Egyptians as described by Seligmann, the Word in the Gospel of John, and 
the theurgy of the Russian symbolists all constitute languages of myth. Language, 
in the mythical sense, “is the place where being is spoken.”42 Adams asserts that 
language, conceived of as proliﬁc and mythical, through the process of naming, 
does not simply nominate beings to their being, but rather generates being. Unlike 
the language of antimyth, wherein the world precedes language, in the language 
of myth, the world follows language, which creates and contains it. Such language 
provides the contrary to the subject/object negation of antimyth. Such language 
is symbolic.
Adams describes the transition of language as creation (mythic) to language 
as disclosure (antimythic) by again referencing the story of Blake’s ancient poets. 
As Blake’s poets developed the language, simultaneously creating the world, a 
system was developed that brought dissociation between the creating word and 
the created world through a process of externalization, or what Blake refers to as 
“devouring.” This system  
took some advantage of & enslav’d the vulgar by attempting 
to realize or abstract the mental deities from their objects:  thus 
began the Priesthood.
Choosing forms of worship from poetic tales.
And at length they pronounced that the Gods had order’d such 
things.
Thus men forgot that All deities reside in the human breast.43 
These devouring priests take in, ingest, the proliﬁc power of language. But in this 
ingesting, the mythic language is transformed into its opposite. The ingestion might 
more properly be understood as “defecation,” for in this action, the world created 
and contained by language is externalized, cast outside and prior to language. 
This world is conceived as preceding language, temporally and epistemologically. 
The move is from circumference to center, internal to external. “The devourer,” 
claims Adams, “is a machine for externalizing.”44 He “swallows” myth and 
“defecates” antimyth, allegory, and the negation of subject/object. The devourer 
stands at the center while the proliﬁc ancient poets remain at the circumference. 
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This devourer is the interpreter, the critic, a member of the “priesthood” who has 
separated language from the world—or, in the case of the occult priest, the world 
from the divine—and acts as an intermediary. This intermediary is now necessary 
to interpret or explain the mysteries of the alien separateness that is the world, 
and also the poetic text—the former, in his devouring act, having been divorced 
from the latter. The poetic text is symbolic, and thus proliﬁc, and generates from 
itself food for devouring, which is to say, interpreting. Ultimately, the position of 
such priests is ironic, for they stand at a center that is actually a circumference. By 
this, I mean that their antimyth of externality is itself a creation of language and 
therefore mythic. It is what Adams calls an “antimythical ﬁction.”45 Language is 
symbolic and mythical because it contains that which it creates. Any example of 
poetry or drama creates—as opposed to signiﬁes—a world that is not external but 
contained within it. This conception of language as symbolic, of literature as a 
proliﬁc, symbolic activity, is the secular symbolic of Adams. 
In this mythic model, we discover that language does not refer to a world that 
is cast outside and prior to language. Here, language no longer describes the world; 
it is the world. We understand the world through language. Yet the world, in this 
sense, is not prior to language. On the contrary, it is created by language as the 
Johnian God created the world through the speaking of the Word, through speaking 
himself. The world is a linguistic creation of the Edenic Word.
Simply put, we do not know the world through language. We know the world 
as language. 
A number of years ago, I attended a symposium on educational strategies in 
the academy. I listened as a geology professor explained how he approached his 
subject. “The rock,” said the geologist, “speaks to me. If I attend to what the rock 
is trying to tell me, I will discover something about it. I try to teach my students to 
listen to the rock, to attend to what the rock is trying to tell them.” Of course, the 
geologist was speaking metaphorically. For him, rock exists outside of language. By 
examining the rock, he discovers facts about it that can then be expressed through 
language. The language that the geologist “hears” is language that describes the 
rock and thus externalizes it. For the geologist, language is only the power to 
point outward toward things, like rocks and their qualities. The two are separate; 
subject negates object. The geologist is a Blakean priest who interprets the signs 
coming from the alien rock, “listening” to them, decoding their mysteries, and, as 
an educator, initiating his students into the cult of the priesthood so that they too 
may comprehend the secrets of the code emanating from the rocky beyond. 
It struck me at the time that mythic language was the reverse of the situation 
described by the geologist. The rock does not speak to us. We speak the rock. 
Mythic language is not expressive or representational; it is generative. For Adams, 
the notion that language describes a rock that is external to the speech itself is an 
antimythic ﬁction. For prior to its creation in, through, and as language, what, after 
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all, is the rock? It might be compared, in this conception, to the alchemist’s materia 
prima, or perhaps to the primal chaos that often characterizes the pre-cosmogonic 
moment in creation myths, or even, along these same lines, to the mystic Nothing. 
It is through the language of, in this case, the geologist that the rock is called into 
being. “Called,” in this sense may hold the double meaning of both theurgic invoking 
and poetic naming—i.e. “named” into being.
This conception of language as symbolic, proliﬁc, and of myth allows for a 
symbolist theatre, though not as in the modernist movement in Europe and Russia. 
In this theory, theatre contains worlds that are created by and coincident with it. That 
is to say, the world generated by theatrical activity is in a condition of contrariety 
with that activity. The two are not “othered.” The former is not the object to the 
latter’s subject. This theatre of the symbolic, the theatre of myth, like the language 
of myth, is a cosmogonic force that parallels similar notions in the Bible and the 
Kabbalah, where God is the Word and the Divine is language. “By the word of the 
Lord were the heavens made; and all the host of them by the breath of his mouth,” 
states Psalms 33:6.46 For the Kabbalists, as Gershom Scholem suggests, God 
inheres in, through, and as language: “The secret world of the godhead is a world 
of language.”47 One might posit that theatrical activity becomes, in this light, a 
kind of imitatio dei, an imitation of divine creation, and thus holy. But “imitation” 
is the wrong word here, for it suggests an antimythic externalization of the divine 
and involves the banishment of the imitated. Correspondence allows for no such 
banishment. It is, rather, to put a theatrical spin on a Hegelian concept, the Divine 
performing itself. In light of correspondence, both the theatrical activity and the 
world created by it—which are uniﬁed in a condition of contrariety—are inseparable 
from the Divine. It is through reference to this idea that we may understand the 
symbolist’s characterization of the artist as “theurgist” and Bely’s claim that realism 
is actually symbolism, for the latter term, in this conception, extends beyond matters 
of historical style to denote the mythic and creative capacity of the theatrical event 
itself. If we see, in the spectrum of theatre, that the poles of myth and antimyth are 
characterized in the competing ideas of theatrical activity that support the styles 
of symbolism and realism respectively, we may better understand Bely’s analysis 
of realism. For, if antimyth is always emerging from myth as the devourer seeks 
constantly to ingest and externalize the proliﬁc, it is also always cycling back to 
myth. Thus ultimately, as Bely intuits, the antimythic stance of realism is always 
cycling back, always returning to myth and to the symbolic characterized by the 
symbolist movement. We are left with a conception of a symbolic theatre that, in 
its application, reaches beyond the modernist movement of symbolism to describe 
the theatrical event as a dynamic of myth and a cosmogonic activity; a theatre of 
the symbolic, the theatre as symbolic activity. 
I have suggested that poetry and dramatic literature, conceived of as an Edenic 
language of myth, retain a certain cosmogonic force in that they create worlds 
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while containing and coinciding with that which they create. I further submit that 
the theatre must also retain such a force. For whereas in poetry and drama, it is 
language that is the cosmogonic force, in theatre this cosmogonic power is a function 
of the heterogeneous organization of various theatre “languages” that make up 
the performance text. These theatre languages include, but are not limited to, the 
language of the spoken dramatic text, as well as the activities of the actors and the 
other elements of the mise en scène—lighting, scenery, costumes, etc.
Thus far, I have identiﬁed two different conceptions of the symbolic:  the 
miraculous and the secular. As I have suggested, in symbolism, as well as in the 
various religious, mystic, and occult traditions that informed it, a Fall is posited 
that distinguishes and separates reality into a negation of matter/spirit or sensible/
suprasensible. The miraculous symbol is the contrary to these negations. It is a 
circumferential form that encompasses matter and spirit as a unity in which each 
constituent also contains the whole. Both the spiritual and the material worlds 
are symbols composed of symbols, each of which encompasses the whole of 
both worlds. These are not signifying allegories but creative symbols that create 
a world that does not precede but rather follows and is coincident with them as 
the world followed and was contained by the speaking of the original Word or 
Logos by God. This mirrors the world of the ancient poets, a world created and 
contained by poetic language. In each model, the Divine Word or poetic word both 
creates and constitutes the world. If language is thus creative and symbolic in this 
way, then the miraculous symbol, that symbol that implies yet uniﬁes a Fall or 
primal bifurcation, is conceivable as parallel to Adams’s secular symbolic, for the 
separation, the absolute unlikeness, the negation of the Fall when it is created in 
language, is made into a unity, an absolute likeness, and a contrary by the mythic 
language. Here, the Fall is the action of the Blakean devourer that swallows myth 
and defecates antimyth, thus bifurcating reality into a series of negations. The 
emergence of antimyth in the action of the devourers is the separation of the Divine 
and its power of creation from humankind and the world. Where the Fall is this 
action, the distinction between the secular symbolic and miraculous symbolic is 
dissolved or at least lessened. The latter is differentiated from the former only by 
the fact that it takes into account and maintains the historical opposition of matter 
and spirit.
Thus the Fall, by this conception, is a linguistic and performative activity that 
emerges through the signiﬁcatory model of literature and theatre. Here, the Fall is not 
conceived as history, as something that happened “then,” or even as a mythological 
explanation of a past rupture. It is always present, it is always happening now, it 
is always reinscribing itself. We do not speak of the Fall. We speak the Fall. We 
perform it. I am writing it now. The Fall is an “antimythic ﬁction,” a concept that 
Adams describes in terms of an hypostatizing action. Adams’s description of 
hypostatization is strikingly similar to many Gnostic and Kabbalistic narratives 
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of cosmogenetic bifurcation or Fall—narratives involving divine emanation or 
contraction, narratives in which the self-alienation of the Divine, like Adams’s 
language, results in the projection of a being (e.g. the Demiurge) or realm “outside” 
the divine wholeness. As Adams states:
However, even though concepts are creations inside and as the 
very form of language, language hypostatizes or projects concepts 
and ﬁctionalizes an apartness for them. This is what . . . I call the 
creation of “antimyth”—the ﬁctive projection to an “outside” of 
something language really retains in itself (thus the creation of 
the ﬁction of difference) followed by the ﬁction that the outside 
preceded its container.48
Within the antimythic conception of signiﬁcation, every utterance, every instance of 
literature, and all theatrical activity is a reconstitution of this ﬁction, a performance 
of the Fall. Thus may one, through ﬁgurality, contemplate the frankly bizarre and 
amusing notion that there is a parallel to be drawn between the devouring, antimythic 
“priest” or critic, on the one hand, and the Edenic serpent or satanic “adversary,” 
on the other. Surely there are many artists who would be willing to support the idea 
of the critic as Satan, but we need not leap to such extremes. 
As Adams would have it, the secular symbol would be coincident with that 
which it symbolizes only on a “mundane” level. That is, the word “rose,” when it 
appears in the text of, for example, Aleksandr Blok’s The Rose and the Cross, does 
not point to, copy, or signify a rose or the idea of a rose. The rose in the text is a 
rose (a rose is a rose, is a rose, is a rose . . .). The appearance of a rose in the proliﬁc 
text, whether literary or performative, creates a rose in the world of the play. The 
textual word or the theatrical object, even if the latter is only a stick with a red bit 
of rag tied to it, creates and contains the rose and is coincident with it. This is the 
secular symbol. However, if the action of the devourers, the activity of antimyth, 
is precisely the action of the Fall, the primal bifurcation of reality into the negation 
of spirit/matter, then the symbol, as the activity of myth, is a reparation of this 
breach. Matter and spirit are thus indivisibly coincident. The textual rose, in this 
case, is not merely coincident with the actual but mundane rose that it generates. 
The textual rose is also the extra-mundane or Divine Rose, for the two are also 
one. This rose is thus, for instance, the divine Rose of Sharon referred to in the 
Song of Solomon, 2:1, the rose that the Kabbalistic text, the Zohar, designates as 
the Shekhinah, the Divine Presence.49 I am not suggesting that the rose, whether on 
the stage or the page, somehow points to or signiﬁes this divine ﬁgure. Rather, the 
rose is both a rose and the Shekhinah. The two are in a relationship of identity. This 
is the miraculous symbol. These two models of miraculous and secular symbolic 
are not so far apart. The difference is that, while the secular symbol is the contrary 
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to the negation subject/object, the miraculous symbol is additionally the contrary 
to spirit/matter. 
This example needs some clariﬁcation. It is somewhat misleading to pluck the 
rose out of the theatrical or dramatic context in which it appears, for the symbolic, 
secular or miraculous should not be understood as operating in a segregated and 
static sense. That is to say, the relationship between the symbol and that which 
it creates and contains should not be conceived of as singular and isolated. The 
symbolic is an activity of language rather than its atomization. We must not think of 
the symbolic as a segregated object or trope—or sets of objects or tropes—within 
the text or performance. Rather, the text or performance is itself a symbolic activity, 
a dynamic and generative process as opposed to an isolated and static matrix.
A more telling example emerges in Peter Brook’s description of Grotowski’s 
Akropolis. In his introduction to the ﬁlmed version, Brook addresses the problems 
faced by theatrical producers attempting to create stage representations of the 
Holocaust. To many artists, claims Brook, a purely descriptive, documentary 
approach seemed the only way to adequately represent the Holocaust. How, after 
all, is one to represent the unrepresentable, speak the unspeakable, without doing 
violence to it? Without, as with différance and Ein-sof above, diminishing and thus 
erasing it? Grotowski, according to Brook’s description, avoided this conundrum 
by forgoing representation altogether. Instead, claims Brook, Grotowski was able 
to create (not “re-create”) a death-camp world onstage.
At certain moments in Akropolis, because a nameless horror 
was not described, was not referred to, was not brought into 
our imagination as something that once happened in a place 
called Auschwitz, it actually was brought into being there. . . . 
[Grotowski] has made an imaginative work of art, which at ﬁrst 
sight has the trappings of art. . . . And one could say this is turning 
the naked reality of the concentration camp into something 
inferior:  an attempt by an artist to make a beautiful work of art. 
. . . And gradually . . . one sees that this is not what happens. 
What they are doing is making the spirit of that concentration 
camp live again for a moment. And so in a sense their work is 
more realistic, because even the statistic refers to the past. Even 
the man describing, as in a court room, what happened, refers 
to the past. . . . [Grotowski] actually makes the sense of the 
concentration camp, for a moment, reappear.50
Brook frames Akropolis as a cosmogony, as a mythic text that creates and contains 
rather than externalizes through representation. Here, the death camp is not projected 
outward from the performance as external and prior. It is present. The languages 
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of the production contain and are coincident with the “Holocaust world” they 
generate. 
The question of Brook’s identiﬁcation of Grotowski’s productions with “holy” 
theatre I shall leave aside for the purposes of this essay. Two further points need 
to be made about this example. Firstly, Brook is speaking as a critic, and thus his 
comments involve a certain irony. In speaking of Grotowski’s production, Brook 
constitutes it as an object external to his own act of criticism even as this act is itself 
a creating of, and a ﬁctionalization of apartness for, this text. Criticism occupies a 
position somewhere between the poles of myth and antimyth, somewhere between 
the circumference and the center. Through the mechanism of a necessarily reductive 
analysis, it claims to describe or copy something external to itself—the mythic text. 
It points outward towards the text that it describes. Yet its description is a creative 
act that ﬁctionalizes an apartness for the creation it contains. The critic is always 
constituting that which she purports to describe. This is the irony of criticism. 
“[C]riticism,” claims Adams, “is ﬁnally, like all symbolic forms, at least partly a 
making of its own. From its ironic area, it produces an antimyth of bifurcations 
even while it protects the poem’s myth.”51 It is a constant pulling back and forth 
of creation and copying, of the proliﬁc and devouring, of contrariety and negation, 
of symbol and allegory. I do not exclude this essay from such irony. Of course, the 
hermeneutic or interpretive act is performed not merely by the critic, but, in the 
theatre, by the director, designer, and audience. Each of these is a link in the chain 
of creation that is the hermeneutic act. The collection of makings created by this 
chain of activity that proceeds outward from a text is ultimately externalized by 
critics as culture. 
Yet criticism is not identical to poetry, drama, direction, or design in its 
creativity. Criticism is a kind of making. It is ironically so, for it claims that what 
it makes is a copy, a description, or a re-presentation of that which is external to 
it:  the proliﬁc text. Though the designer and director may engage in hermeneutic 
activity with the dramatic text as object, what they create is not criticism, but theatre. 
Theatre, like mythic poetry, is not an interpretation or representation of something 
prior and external to it (the dramatic text or the world, for example) however much 
critical and anitmythical thought interprets it as such. Theatre is creation. 
Secondly, Brook identiﬁes Grotowski’s work as creation and opposes it to 
other works (he speciﬁcally mentions Peter Weiss’s The Investigation) that he 
characterizes as representation. These latter works presume to describe that which 
is prior and external to the work itself. Thus for Brook, Akropolis becomes, in 
our terminology, the mythic text,52 while other works are antimythic. But I am 
not willing to privilege Akropolis in this sense, regardless of how much I may 
admire it. My position is that both of the models Brook cites are constitutive, both 
are generative, and therefore, both are mythic. Adams, in addressing literature, 
locates all literature at the mythic pole, regardless of style. In transposing Adams’s 
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theories of the symbolic into a theatrical context, I am likewise opposed to Brook’s 
distinction. All theatre is mythic, cosmogonic. This holds for Akropolis, The 
Investigation, and, for that matter, Private Lives. 
In summary, if theatre retains a cosmogonic force, if, through the heterogeneous 
organization of theatre languages, it creates a world with which it is also coincident, 
then it is a symbolic activity in a secular sense and encloses the opposition of 
subject/object within contrariety. Further, if the cosmogonic theatre, through 
correspondence, is a symbolic activity in the miraculous sense, then the identity of 
subject and object is also achieved. But here, the activity of the theatre is the subject 
and the divine, its object. The contrariety of this negation, achieved in the radically 
creative performance, accomplishes the identity of matter and Spirit, of mundane 
and Divine. In such performance, there is no signiﬁcation of the transcendent, 
no deracinated referral or “pointing” to the Divine, for these are created by and 
coincident with the performance itself. Here, metonymically speaking, the wine is 
the blood of Christ. The Divine performs itself. It is thus that theatre may be holy, 
not through signiﬁcation that only reiﬁes as it re-enacts the Fall, but through the 
radical creativity of performance.
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